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COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY:
A CASE STUDY OF LOVING V. VIRGINIA,
BOWERS V. HARD WICK, AND LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Andrea Celina Coleman'
I. INTRODUCTION
The cognitive dissonance theory' suggests that people strive for
consistency between and among their thoughts.2 Dissonance or discord
occurs when new ideas are inconsistent with a person's individually held
beliefs. The theory states that people prefer not to have cognitive
4dissonance and eliminate it at the first opportunity. This premise is a
cornerstone of the American legal system, which strives for equity and
impartiality. If a party in a lawsuit presents a law as unfair or unjust, the
possibility of cognitive dissonance is heightened and judges are more likely
to seek resolution of the problem.
This article compares briefs submitted to the United States Supreme
Court by the opposing sides in Loving v. Virginia5 and Bowers v. Hardwick6
and examines the impact of cognitive dissonance on the outcome of those
cases. Had the respondents in Bowers used cognitive dissonance the way
that the appellants did in Loving, Hardwick would have won. Lawrence v.
Texas7 reinforces this theory.
II. THE LoVING BRIEFS
In June 1958, Mildred Jeter, an African-American female, married
Richard Perry Loving, a white male, in the District of Columbia. The
Lovings, Virginia residents, returned home to face arrest warrants because
their interracial marriage violated Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws.9 The
Lovings pleaded guilty and the Virginia Supreme Court sentenced them to a
one-year suspended sentence provided that they left the state for at least
J.D. 2003, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
Leon Festinger, a social scientist, developed the cognitive dissonance theory. See EM GRIFFIN,
A FIRST LOOK AT COMMUNICATION THEORY (3d ed. 1997) (explaining the theory in Chapter 16),
http://www.afirstlook.comI/archive/cogdiss.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
2 MAGILL'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 358 (Nancy A. Piotrowski & Tracy Irons-
George eds., 1st ed. 2003).
3 See GRIFFIN, supra note 1.
4 See id.
5 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
6 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
7 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
9 Id. at 2-3.
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twenty-five years.'0 They appealed, arguing that Virginia's laws violated the
Constitution."
The State of Virginia began its brief with a history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and argued that the framers lacked the intent of prohibiting anti-
miscegenation laws.' 2 The State cited subsequent state and federal judicial
decisions upholding the constitutionality of these laws. 3 The State further
argued that because the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply, it would be
inappropriate for the Court to delve into the wisdom of this law.'
4
In their brief, the Lovings argued that miscegenation laws were relics
of slavery and expressions of racism.'5 They substantiated this argument by
detailing the early history of white racial superiority and the enactment of the
Racial Integrity Act of 1924.16 They further argued that such laws caused
social harm 7 and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
III. THE BOWERS BRIEFS
In August 1982, Georgia police broke into the home of Michael
Hardwick and observed him engaging in the act of sodomy with another
man.' 9 The police then arrested Hardwick for violating a Georgia statute that
criminalized sodomy. 20 Although the State of Georgia later chose not to
indict him, the statute of limitations left Hardwick open to possible
prosecution for the next four years.2' With potential prosecution looming,
Hardwick filed suit, arguing that sodomy laws were unconstitutional.22
In its brief, the State of Georgia first argued that the lower court
erroneously interpreted prior precedent.23 In Doe v. City of Richmond,24 the
district court held Virginia's sodomy statute constitutional and the United
States Supreme Court had affirmed without issuing an opinion.25 The court
of appeals in Bowers, however, disregarded the Doe holding, finding the
10 Id. at 3.
1 Id. at 3-4.
12 Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 31, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (No.
395).
13 Id. at 32.
14 id. at 38.
15 Brief for Appellants at 15, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
16 See id. at 16-24.
17 See id. at 24-28.
[a See id. at 28-39.
19 See Brief for Respondent at I, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 2.
22 Id.
23 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Bowers v. Hardwick,478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
24 Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
25 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Bowers (No. 85-140).
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Virginia statute unconstitutional.26 The court believed that the Supreme
Court in Doe might have affirmed the ruling because the plaintiffs lacked
standing and not necessarily because it agreed with the substantive ruling in
Doe.27  Therefore, the court drew its own conclusion about the
constitutionality of the sodomy laws.28 In its brief, the State argued that this
interpretation was in error.29 The State also argued that the Constitution did
not grant a fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy. 30 The
State argued that the right of privacy did not encompass acts of sodomy
because permitting those acts was inconsistent with history and tradition.3
In the respondent's brief, Hardwick argued that because the conduct
was intimate in nature and took place in the home, the State had to show
special justification for regulating the conduct.3 2  He then argued that
heightened scrutiny of this law would not necessitate heightened scrutiny of
other laws against prostitution and public indecency.33 Finally, Hardwick
argued that the State's goal of preserving morality was not substantial
enough to withstand close scrutiny.34
IV. COMPARING THE BRIEFS OF LOVING AND BOWERS
Both cases were battles over deeply rooted emotional issues. In each
case, the side with the most compelling emotional and psychological pleas to
the Justices won. In Loving, the State of Virginia's most compelling tactic
was to rely on science and racial prejudice; in contrast, the Lovings' most
compelling tactic was to appeal to the Justices' fears of being perceived as
racists. The Lovings prevailed because the cognitive dissonance that would
have resulted from the affirmation of racist laws outweighed the scientific
arguments and racist views exploited by the State.
In Bowers, the State of Georgia strategically relied on homophobia,
history, and tradition. Hardwick's most compelling tactic would have been
to scare the Justices into equating support of the law with discrimination,
thereby creating cognitive dissonance. However, Hardwick failed to make
such a plea. Instead, he restricted his argument to a strictly legal analysis of
privacy in the home. In order to combat something as deeply rooted in the
culture as homosexual animus, Hardwick needed to fight back with
26 Id. at 4.
27 Id.




32 Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
33 Id. at 21-22.
34 Id. at 25-27.
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something emotionally and psychologically charged. His downfall was his
failure to come up with an emotional plea that demonstrated cognitive
dissonance for judicial consideration.
A. The Use of Race and Morality. The Winning Arguments
The Lovings framed the Virginia statute and their case as a race
issue. They deliberately used words and phrases that promoted immediate
emotional responses in the Justices. The second sentence of the brief boldly
stated that the case "gives [the] Court an appropriate opportunity to strike
down the last remnants of legalized slavery in our country-the anti-
miscegenation laws. 35 The Lovings asserted that the State passed the laws
to foster and implement the institution of slavery36 and to preserve the
integrity of the "White Race" for reasons analogous to Hitler's goal of a
"Super Race. 37  Recognizing the general aversion to being perceived as
racist during the Civil Rights era, the Lovings focused the issue on
discrimination rather than constitutionality.
The oral arguments evidence the effectiveness of this argument.
During the State's oral argument, the Court asked the attorney,
May I ask you this question? Aside from all questions of genetics,
physiology, psychiatry, sociology, and everything else-aside
from all that, forgetting it for the moment-is there any doubt in
your mind that the object of these statutes, the basic premise on
which they rest, is that the white people are superior to the colored
people, and should not be permitted to marry them?
38
The Court therefore understood that the case rested on whether the State
predicated the law on notions of inequality.
In Bowers, the State defined the issue as one involving sodomy and
morality. The State described the conduct in question as conduct "which for
hundreds of years, if not thousands, has been uniformly condemned as
immoral. 39 The State said that traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribed
the conduct4° and referenced several passages from the Bible.4 ' In its brief,
the State described sodomy as "sexual deviancy" and "an unnatural means of
satisfying an unnatural lust, which [was] declared by Georgia to be morally
35 Brief for Appellants at 1, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
36 Id. at 9.
37 Id.
38 Tr. of Oral Arg. at 32, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
39 Brief of Petitioner at 19, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
40 Id. at 20.
41 Id. at 21.
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wrong.'4 2 The State analogized sodomy to polygamy, consensual incest, and
liaisons with prostitutes.43 In one of its most blatant attempts to appeal to the
homophobic fears of the Court, the State asserted that "homosexual sodomy
leads to other deviate practices such as sadomasochism, group orgies, or
transvestism.",44 The State referred to research characterizing homosexual
sodomy by "multiplicity and anonymity of sexual partners, disproportionate
involvement with adolescents and, indeed, possible relationship[s] to crimes
of violence. ' 45 Finally, the State linked homosexual sodomy to Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and diseases such as anorectal
gonorrhea and Hepatitis.
46
Like the State of Virginia in Loving, the State of Georgia
intentionally made these statements. The State was familiar with its
audience and the way that its statements would affect the Justices. The State
intended to trigger homophobia in these very old, very conservative,
religiously indoctrinated judges with repeated references to sodomy as
immoral and unnatural. Similarly, the State mentioned AIDS and promoted
stereotypes about homosexuals to trigger the Justices' deeply rooted fears.
In doing so, the State clearly demonstrated its belief that it was writing for a
sympathetic audience. In contrast, the language of the Loving briefs
evidences the State's uncertainty as to whether the Justices would be
sympathetic to arguments that implied racial inequality. The fact that the
State in Bowers was not afraid of offending the Justices with homophobic
sentiments indicates its awareness that the Justices were indoctrinated by a
society that did not find this speech repellent.
In Loving, the State of Virginia tried not to respond to the Lovings'
arguments about racial inequality. Instead, the State insisted that any inquiry
into the wisdom of the law would be improper and should be left to the
legislature.47  The State therefore submitted evidence suggesting that
upholding the law was not unequivocal racism. This evidence included a
quote from Dr. Albert I. Gordon: "The argument that persons who oppose
intermarriage-religious or racial-are per se 'prejudiced,' may be true of
some persons . . . yet be completely untrue about still others. '48 Inclusion of
42 Id. at 27.
43 Id. at 32-33.
44 Id. at 36 (citing KARLA JAY & ALLEN YOUNG, THE GAY REPORT: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
SPEAK OUT ABOUT SEXUAL EXPERIENCES AND LIFESTYLES 563-64 (1 st ed. 1979)).
45 Id. at 37 (citing PAUL CAMERON, INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION OF
SEXUALITY, REPORT ON HOMOSEXUALITY AND MURDER (1984); ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG,
HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 309 (1978)).
46 Id.
47 Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 7, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No.
395).
" Id. at 48.
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this quote acknowledged that the State believed that the Justices were
concerned about being perceived as prejudiced.
Like the State of Virginia in Loving, Hardwick's brief avoided the
controversial topic, in this case homosexuality. Hardwick instead argued for
privacy in the home and in the bedroom: "At issue in this case is whether the
State of Georgia may send its police into private bedrooms to arrest adults
for engaging in consensual, noncommercial sexual acts, with no justification
beyond the assertion that those acts are immoral. " 49 The brief made frequent
references to the sanctity of the home and of the bedroom.50
To some degree, Hardwick tried to confront the anti-homosexual
sentiments of the Court. He argued that homosexual sodomy could not be
"deemed transparently evil."51 He justified this proposition by arguing that
over half of the states had decriminalized sodomy5 2 and that permitting
homosexual sodomy did not equate to opening the door to other acts. 3 He
insisted that homosexual sodomy was a private issue, whereas public
indecency, prostitution, and pimping remained public issues still subject to
state regulation. 4  Hardwick called the State's characterizations of
homosexuals "imaginative recasting[s]" based on "irrational fear and
prejudice.""
Although the law in Bowers was as discriminatory toward
homosexuals as the law in Loving was toward people of color, Hardwick
dealt with the discrimination in a relatively subdued way. He did not make
grandiose statements about the hardships endured by homosexuals. Instead,
he avoided the topic of homosexual sodomy as much as possible, referencing
it only to denounce the State's homophobic characterizations. He took this
approach because he understood the unlikelihood of swaying the Justices by
arguing in favor of the morality of sodomy. This was so because there was
no pre-existing sentiment against homophobia.
Hardwick should not have expected to win on an emotionally
charged topic such as homosexuality without convincing the Justices that
homophobia was "bad." Recasting the issue as one of privacy was not
effective because the Court could not forget that the case was about
homosexuality. Whereas the Loving Court was unwilling to go on the record
supporting racism, the Bowers Court was willing to go on the record
49 Brief for Respondent at 1, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
50 See, e.g., id. at 4, 7-9.
sI Id. at 13.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 19.
54 Id. at21.
5s Id. at 22 n.38.
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denouncing homosexual acts. In the minds of the Justices, homophobic laws
were not "bad" because Hardwick's brief had failed to cast them as such.
B. The Use of Science and Sanctity of the Home:
The Losing Arguments
In Loving, the State carefully avoided racist language but included
scientific testimony portraying interracial marriage as bad. 6 Instead of
making explicit statements denouncing interracial marriage, the State
presented the negative scientific views of others. The State argued, "This
work has been characterized as 'the definitive book on intermarriage,"' 57
instead of "this book is the definitive book on intermarriage." The State thus
covertly presented information to avoid offending the Justices.
In Bowers, Hardwick touted the sanctity of the home instead of
attempting to make the case a rights issue. He argued that the State had no
right to invade the privacy of a person's home." He broadly defined the
privacy right in question, realizing that the Justices would be wary of
declaring a constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
Hardwick's privacy argument was intelligent, focusing the Justices' minds
on a traditional constitutional right. The Justices, however, did not forget
that the case was about homosexuality. Hardwick thus should have argued
beyond the law with a strong emotional plea to counter the morality
argument.
In Loving, the State did not use the scientific arguments it had used
before the Virginia Supreme Court. The Lovings responded to the
arguments anyway, using their brief as a forum to acknowledge and dispel
myths about race: "[T]he maintenance of racial purity or integrity is a
meretricious basis for these laws for there is no evidence to support the
existence of the so-called 'pure' races." '9 Even if one could attain racial
purity, they argued, the law would not effectuate that purpose.W° The
Lovings also argued that the only race protected by the laws was the
Caucasian race6' and presented evidence that race mixing did not "cause
biologically deleterious results. 62  Despite these strong science-based
arguments, the Lovings won the case due to their characterization of the law
as racist.
56 Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 18-21, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(No. 395).
57 Id. (emphasis added).
s8 Brief for Respondent at 4, 7-9, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
59 Brief for Appellants at 35, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No, 395).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 37.
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The State's response to Hardwick's argument about the sanctity of
the home was to use legal arguments that preyed on the Justices' fears. First,
the State argued that in order for something to fall into the privacy realm, it
must be a fundamental right established by history.63 It impressed upon the
Court that states had historically regulated sodomy.64  The State further
argued that including homosexual sodomy within the realm of privacy would
open the door for "polygamy, homosexual marriage, fornication, adultery
and some cases of incest. ' 65  Equating overturning the sodomy law with
things that the Justices found repugnant was a deliberate and effective
technique.
This effectiveness was evident in the oral arguments. The Supreme
Court's first question was about the limits of privacy and whether it would
open the door to other acts: "[I]s there a limiting principle to your argument?
... [H]ow do you draw the line between bigamy involving private homes or
incest or prostitution.... ?,66 The Court persisted in this line of inquiry:
You emphasize the home [as a limiting principle] and so would I if
I were arguing this case, but what about-Take an easier one, a
motel room or the back of an automobile, or toilet or wherever...
What about incest in the private home? ... Suppose it is parent
and adult child. Those are two consenting adults then perhaps. ....
[Y]our line of reasoning would make the Edmonds Act
unconstitutional, would it not? ... [T]he Edmonds Act forbade
cohabitation by one who is already married. . . . [W]ould you
distinguish the home between the back of an automobile? ...
And, a public toilet of course? .. . What about a hotel room
overnight?
67
It is clear from the myriad of questions that the State's scare tactic was very
effective in rattling the Justices.
V. How HARDWICK COULD HAVE PREVAILED
Hardwick should have modeled his arguments on the Lovings' brief
in Loving. First, his preliminary statement should have read that this case
"'gives [the] court an appropriate opportunity to strike down' 68 homophobia
63 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 6-7, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140).
64 Id. at 6-8.
65 Id. at 13.
6 Tr. of Oral Arg. at 16, 1986 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 74, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (No. 85-140).
67 Id. at 16-22.
68 Brief for Appellants at I, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
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in our country-the sodomy laws of Georgia and the twenty-four states that
criminalize consensual sodomy." Second, he should have focused on the
discriminatory intent behind laws motivated by sexual intolerance and
antagonism toward homosexuals.69 Hardwick could have drawn parallels to
similar laws in Nazi Germany used to persecute homosexuals. 0 Third, he
should have included a section on the immeasurable social harm caused by
anti-homosexual laws7' and cited instances of hate crimes against gays.
Finally, Hardwick could have included data demonstrating that the social
stigma of homosexuality causes severe anxiety, sometimes leading to
suicide.72 This would have given the Justices an opportunity to stop
government-endorsed social harms.
In Loving, the Lovings adamantly argued that a ruling in favor of the
State would promote racism. While homosexual equality did not have the
social support of the civil rights movement in 1986, Hardwick could
similarly have discussed rights, discrimination, violence, hatred, and fear.
The Hardwick brief could have benefited from plenary evidence of
discrimination and violence such that the Justices would have been
compelled to view the case as a rights issue. The Justices might then have
sided with Hardwick in a conscious effort to promote civil and human rights,
as they did in Loving.
Justice Powell, the fifth vote in the majority opinion, contemplated
siding with the dissent in Bowers, which would have changed the outcome of
the case.73 In a lecture before New York University law students, Justice
Powell said that Hardwick "had not been prosecuted, 'much less convicted,
and sentenced.' 7 4 This remark suggests that Justice Powell did not believe
that the State had unduly burdened Hardwick. However, an argument
detailing the harms that anti-sodomy statutes inflicted on homosexuals might
have compelled Justice Powell to view the law differently. Other sources
suggest that Justice Powell decided in favor of the Georgia statute because he
did not know any homosexuals and found it hard to believe that homosexuals
could be active members of society.75 Justice Powell's remark further
suggests that the Court is influenced by emotions and personal experiences
69 Id. at 9.
70 See generally BEN S. AUSTIN, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE HOLOCAUST, at
http://www.mtsu.edu/-baustin/homobg.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
71 Brief for Appellants at 24, Loving (No. 395).
72 See generally C. Barillas, Gay Youth Higher Suicide Risk, THE DATA LOUNGE, Aug. 28, 1997,
at http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/news/record.html?record=2303 (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
73 Al Kamen, Powell Changed Vote in Sodomy Case, WASHINGTON POST, July 13, 1986, at
Al. 74 Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at
A3. 75 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 53-
54 (1st ed. 1997).
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as much as it is influenced by legal arguments. An argument addressing
social ignorance and homophobia with facts and illustrations might therefore
have changed Justice Powell's vote.
VI. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: GAY RIGHTS PREVAIL
In 2003, the Supreme Court eliminated cognitive dissonance with
Lawrence v. Texas.76 In Lawrence, the Court faced a sodomy law similar to
Bowers; this time, however, phrasing the argument as a gay rights issue
changed the outcome. The petitioners' brief emphasized the importance of
eliminating homophobia and made the Justices feel uncomfortable allowing
another Bowers holding.
On September 17, 1998, Texas police entered the home of John
Lawrence on a false report of "weapons disturbance."07 Once inside, the
police witnessed Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Tyron Garner engaging in sex in Mr.
Lawrence's bedroom. Police arrested the two men under a statute known
as the "Homosexual Conduct Law," which criminalized deviate sexual
intercourse with persons of the same sex.7 9 The two men pleaded nolo
contendere and received a $200 fine. ° On appeal, the Texas Court of
Appeals initially reversed the lower court but later reinstated the convictions
en banc.8' Both men appealed to the United States Supreme Court.82
In the petitioners' brief, Lawrence and Garner based their arguments
on substantive due process and equal protection. The substantive due
process argument stated that fundamental liberty interests exist for private
sexual relations.83 The equal protection argument stated that the statute
discriminated against homosexuals without a rational basis84 and that the law
fueled discrimination against homosexuals.8 5
The State of Texas contended that Lawrence's claim failed under
substantive due process and maintained that the statute did not violate equal
protection. Responding to the substantive due process argument, the State
argued that the petitioners were not members of the class seeking the liberty
interest.86  It next argued that Lawrence should lose under the Supreme
76 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003).
'n Id. at 2477.
79 Id.




83 Brief of Petitioner at 11, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102).
4 Id. at 32.
85 Id. at 45.
86 Respondent Brief at 11, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102) (contending
that there was no confirmation that petitioners were in fact homosexuals).
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Court's historical approach of determining the existence of a liberty interest
because tradition did not protect sodomy. The State also argued that stare
decisis required the Court to remain consistent with Bowers.8 The State
next argued that the Court should use a rational basis standard of review for
the Texas statute89 and that the statute bore a rational relationship to the
legitimate interest of promoting morality.90 Finally, the State argued that the
statute was facially neutral and that even if Lawrence showed that the law
had a disparate impact on homosexuals, the record did not show that the
petitioners were in fact homosexuals.9'
The Lawrence petitioners "normalized" gay relationships by
providing examples of gay families. They argued,
Most lesbians and gay men want intimate relationships and are
successful in creating them. .... Same sex relationships often last
a lifetime, and provide deep sustenance to each member of the
couple. .... These families live in 99.3% of American counties...
Virtually every state permits gay men and lesbians to adopt
children individually, jointly and/or through second-parent
adoptions.92
These statements removed homosexual stigmas and stereotypes, making it
difficult for Justices to view homosexuals as an 'other' group.
The petitioners also characterized the laws as discriminatory,
contending that "[t]he Homosexual Conduct Law and its badge of criminality
functions to make gay people unequal in myriad spheres of everyday life and
continue an ignominious history of discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 9 3 Furthermore,
[t]he Homosexual Conduct Law does not just discriminate against
gay and lesbian Texans in their private intimate relations, but
brands gay persons as second-class citizens and legitimizes
discrimination against them in all aspects of life. . . [T]he
discrimination worked by this law reflects and reinforces a
century-long history of discrimination against gay Americans.94
87 Id. at 13.
8 Id. at 24.
9 Id. at 28.
90 Id. at 42.
91 Id. at 33.
9 Brief of Petitioner at 17-18, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102).
93 Id. at 34.
94 ld. at 40-4 1.
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The petitioners further sought the sympathy of the Justices by
arguing that "[s]odomy laws are often invoked to deny or restrict gay
parents' custody of or visitation with their own children, to deny public
employment to gay Fpeople, and to block protection of gay citizens under hate
crime legislation."9  And by "deeming them 'sex[ual] deviants,' states
involuntarily commit gay men and lesbians to mental institutions under
extremely inhumane conditions ... . 'Treatments' to 'cure' homosexuality
were often sadistically cruel .... Additionally, "[v]iolence motivated by
irrational hatred of gay people can result in crimes of unimaginable brutality,
as occurred with the murder of college student Matthew Shepard. '9 7 Unlike
the respondents in Bowers, the Lawrence petitioners humanized their cause,
thereby strengthening their plea for gay rights.
The oral arguments demonstrate that some Justices had reservations
about striking down the Texas statute. The attorney for Lawrence and
Garner stated that Texas discriminated against one group and favored
another, mirroring the Lovings' arguments that the Court risked cognitive
dissonance by not deciding in favor of individual rights.98 Justice Scalia
countered,
I mean you can put it that way, but society always-in a lot of its
lves-makes these moral judgments. You can make it sound very
puritanical, the-you know, the laws-the laws against bigamy, I
mean, who are you to tell me that I can't have more than one wife?
You blue-nose bigot. Sure. You can make it sound that way, but
these are laws dealing with morality.99
In response, the petitioners further emphasized the gay family model by
demonstrating that homosexuals were everyday people fighting for
constitutional rights:
[We] submit it has to be apparent to the Court that there are gay
families, that family relationships are established, that there are
hundreds of thousands of people registered in the Census in the
2000 census who have formed gay families, gay partnerships,
many of them raising children and that for those people, the
opportunity to engage in sexual expression as they will in the
privacy of their own homes performs much the same function that
it does in the marital context, that you can't protect one without the
95 id. at 42.
9 Id. at 46.
9 Id. at 47.
" Tr. of Oral Arg. at 16, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102), available at




other, that it doesn't make sense to draw a line there that you
should protect it for everyone. That this is a fundamental matter of
American values. 1
00
The effectiveness of these arguments was evident in the Justices'
later interaction with the State's counsel. One Justice said, "Bowers has
prove[n] to be harmful to thousands and thousands and thousands of people,
if not because they're going to be prosecuted [but] because they fear it-they
might be, which makes it a possible instrument of repression in the hands of
the prosecutors."' 0 ' Thus, the Court finally realized that gay rights were the
rights of individuals to live their own lives.
The State's substantive due process arguments initially focused on
the history of sodomy laws and the lack of change in the seventeen years
following Bowers.0 2 The State then tried to turn the focus away from the
statute's homophobic origins by contending that the statute prohibited
"extramarital sexual conduct"'1 3 and was not about sexual orientation.' °4 The
State also countered the petitioners' equal protection arguments by claiming
that the statute "rationally furthers other legitimate state interests, namely,
the continued expression of the State's long-standing moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct, and the deterrence of such immoral sexual activity,
particularly with regard to the contemplated conduct of heterosexuals and
bisexuals."'0 5 This statement, which contradicted the State's earlier focus on
"extramarital sexual conduct," probably caused the State to lose the case
because it demonstrated the State's own cognitive disconnect.
The Supreme Court held that the Texas statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, stating that "the liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose
to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives.' 0 6  The Court further acknowledged, "When homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
public and in the private spheres."'0 7 Thus, the Bowers decision "demean[ed]
the lives of homosexual persons."' 0 8
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Dissenting, Justice Scalia wrote that the decision was more about
gay rights than it was about the Fourteenth Amendment.'0 9 Although he
stated that "the Court has taken sides in the culture war,"'10 it was the
petitioners who had characterized the case as one involving sides; the State
simply failed to give the Court a neutral place to stand. Justice Scalia added
that "[t]he Court views it as 'discrimination' which it is the function of
judgments to deter. .... [W]hat the Court calls 'discrimination' against those
who engage in homosexual acts is perfectly legal.""' Perhaps Justice Scalia
was right that it is "legal" to discriminate against homosexuals (or at least
that it was legal before Lawrence); however, it was highly unlikely that a
Supreme Court Justice would align with an opinion that discriminated,
regardless of how "legal" that discrimination was. A cognitive disconnect
would result if the highest court in the land supported bias and homophobia.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia became the best example of the power
of cognitive disconnect. While he blasted the majority for falling prey to the
whims of "the law profession's anti-anti-homosexual culture,"'" 2 Justice
Scalia did the very same thing by writing, "Let me be clear that I have
nothing against homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda
through normal democratic means."' 13  Thus, he too did not want to
experience the cognitive disconnect of being the discriminator.
VII. CONCLUSION
In social sciences, the cognitive dissonance theory requires the
elimination of confusion. In law, a party arguing against deeply entrenched
beliefs must not only make a persuasive legal argument but must also make
strong public policy arguments. In Loving v. Virginia, the Lovings won by
persuading the Supreme Court to look beyond the stigma of interracial
marriage and to focus instead on civil rights. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the
respondents erred by making only legal arguments and not also addressing
the social repercussions of the law. That approach allowed the Court to
continue in its own ignorance about the repercussions of homophobia on gay
Americans. In Lawrence v. Texas, the petitioners won by equating anti-
sodomy laws with discrimination and demonstrating the social harms caused
by the Bowers decision. In both Loving and Lawrence, the Court eliminated
cognitive dissonance by focusing on eliminating social problems; in doing
so, the Court furthered both civil rights and human rights.
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